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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF ODA ON DOMESTIC FISCAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION 
OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES; A CASE STUDY OF RWANDA 
 
By 
 
KABANDA EMMANUEL 
 
ODA (Official Development Assistance) finances government expenditure is crucial in 
raising the living standards of the poor in the developing world. There is a debate, 
however, regarding the impact of ODA on recipient countries with proponents 
emphasizing that foreign aid, in addition to filling the government budgetary gaps of 
developing countries to meet their obligations to their citizenry, it increases the 
imperative on the recipients’ efforts to develop their own capacity with the hope that 
this will enable them to wean off aid; opponents argue that it stifles the capacity of 
recipient governments to create, support and tax their domestic sources and instead 
perpetuates their dependence on aid, promotes rent-seeking, corruption and civil strife. 
This study examines the impact of ODA on Rwanda’s efforts and capacity to generate 
domestic fiscal revenue and draws on the findings to reach a conclusion.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Governments have a duty to extend services to nationals, which services are funded by 
resources mobilized majorly in form of taxes levied on economic activities carried out 
in a country, particularly exchange of goods, services and labour in an economy and 
the activities of citizens carried outside of the country. Many developing countries are 
unable raise enough resources locally to meet their budgetary demands because of the 
existing narrow tax base and in a bid to fill their countries’ budgetary deficits, they 
resort to borrowing through loans which are repaid in future with or without interest 
from bilateral and multilateral sources and aid in form of grants. Indeed foreign aid 
funds a big portion of the fiscal budgets of many developing countries which face 
shortfalls in their domestic revenue mobilization.  
There are studies that showed that ODA has a positive impact on recipient countries by 
reducing corruption, and that it shapes the “relationship between taxation and improved 
governance in much broader ways”. Other studies reported that continued receipts of 
ODA lowers the impetus on the part of recipient countries' governments to build 
relations and representation of local economic actors as taxpayers from domestic 
sources by improving the efficiency and effective use of their tax administration 
systems and processes, widening their tax base, optimizing their domestic tax and the 
general management of the economy in terms of economic growth and development. 
There are studies that reported that aid in large quantities may increase corruption, rent-
seeking and civil strife which are detrimental to increased domestic fiscal revenue 
collection. Moss et al (2006) warned that foreign aid may undermine the strengthening 
of governance structures and that “aid-dependent countries may be inclined to underuse 
their available sources of tax revenues.” It is argued that because those who run 
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governments in developing countries can access ODA, they neglect building systems 
which might otherwise help them overcome their dependency. There are studies that 
found that ODA has neither positive nor negative impact on growth of economies of 
recipient countries.  
There is need to investigate the relationship between ODA and domestic fiscal revenue 
collection of recipient countries. I believe ODA contributes to increased domestic fiscal 
revenue generation of recipient countries and it is my belief that this study will add to 
more understanding the subject of ODA in the context of developing countries’ 
revenue collection and development.  
Using Rwanda as a case study for the study of the impact of ODA on the domestic 
fiscal revenue generation of recipient countries is pertinent given the history of the 
country, the amount of aid (in terms of ODA as a percentage of total fiscal budget not 
in absolute and comperative terms) that was received by the country during its 
rehabilitation and reconstruction stage and the steady increase in the amount of 
domestic taxes as a percentage of GDP, gross taxes, and the comparison between 
potential and actual tax over the period under review. If any country and its 
government could fail to build institutional structures because of ODA, Rwanda would 
be the perfect example, because until recently a sizable portion of the national budget 
was funded through ODA sources. After the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda institutions 
were rebuilt anew in terms of skilled personnel, systems and practices. 
1.1 Statement of the problem  
There is need to understand the impact of ODA on the capacity of recipient countries to 
generate their own fiscal revenue for two major reasons: 
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(1) Aid and donations cannot be sustained forever and at one point donation recipients 
must be responsible for their own consumption and expenditures, and;  
(2) Donor governments cannot be expected to have the means and the political will to 
continue funding the expenditure and consumption of others at the expense of their 
electorates.  
ODA that stifles the ability of developing countries to generate their domestic fiscal 
revenue, therefore, should be re-viewed.  
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The objective of this study is to examine the impact ODA, has had on the ability and 
capacity of Rwanda to generate domestic fiscal revenue given the amount of aid 
(modest in absolute amounts, though, when compared with other countries) the country 
received. The study will highlight the country’s economic growth, revenue volumes 
and tax-base widening given the prevailing circumstances and efforts to increase 
domestic fiscal revenue. 
1.3 Significance of the study 
The study is significant for several reasons: no country has ever developed using ODA; 
all countries need to and must build institutions that support their development, hence, 
use of ODA should have an end game to wean them of external dependence.  Donors, 
on the other hand, should be concerned that their tax resources are used to keep the 
poor countries poorer, with no effort to build their domestic institutional capacity.  
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The study will contribute; it is hoped, to more understanding of the efficacy and 
efficiency of aid which has become a major subject of discussion in both the academic 
and policy arenas. 
1.4 Research questions/hypotheses 
To find out the impact of ODA on Rwanda’s domestic revenue mobilization efforts, I 
intend to use two hypothesis questions. The hypotheses are constructed with a view to 
generating empirical evidence both in quantitative and qualitative form to better 
understand the impact of ODA on the fiscal revenue mobilization efforts of Rwanda as 
a recipient country. To examine the impact of ODA on recipients’ revenue generation 
another country, Uganda, is subjected to the same examination with a view to 
examining the interplay of the country’s GDP, Domestic Tax revenue and amount of 
ODA received during the same period. Two hypotheses are therefore developed to 
guide this study; 
(1) Hypothesis one:  
Ha1: “There is a significant positive relationship between ODA and domestic 
fiscal revenue collected.  
(2) Hypothesis 2:  
Ha2: There is significant positive relationship between ODA and economic 
growth” 
1.5 Research instrument 
This thesis uses quantitative methods to test the two hypotheses using statistical data 
from different sources to test the relationship between ODA and GDP and the 
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relationship between ODA and domestic revenue volumes collected over the period 
under review. Different data from the period 1995 to 2009 when ODA formed the 
bulwark of government fiscal budget in Rwanda are used. Available literature from 
related studies use models which may be broad and complex to comprehend. It is 
hoped that this study will highlight the impact of ODA on the ability of recipient 
countries to generate and collect their domestic revenues using simple and easy to 
apply methods. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
ODA (Official Development Assistance) refers to transfer of “official financing 
administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in character 
with a grant element of at least 25 percent”1. Much of the developing world can hardly 
run their governments without foreign aid particularly ODA which funds part of their 
fiscal budget on social, administrative and governance budgets.  
Kim and Kim (2011) argue that, “If the ability to tax (and to govern) is a measure of a 
state’s capacity, then the capacity of a state can be defined as the power to tax and 
regulate the economy and to withstand political and social challenges from non-state 
actors.” Gurría (2009) states that, “Taxation is a core pillar of a country’s regulatory 
framework for investment and growth. It features prominently in investment decision-
making motivated by profit maximisation, while also spurring local enterprise 
development if properly designed”. The director of OECD development centre, Pezzini 
summed up the importance of domestic fiscal revenue vis-a-vis foreign aid when he 
wrote in The Guardian (2010) that, “Unlike aid money, which will likely to remain 
painfully limited, tax revenue can make an enormous difference to achieving 
development goals. In 2008, the combined fiscal revenue in Africa reached over 
$400bn - 10 times the total amount of aid money flowing to the continent” and warned 
that “With aid money limited, African governments must evolve more efficient 
taxation systems in order to fund development policies.”  
The impact of ODA on recipient countries has been studied and different conclusions 
drawn though consensus has not been reached. Existing literature on the subject of 
                                                 
1
 OECD,  http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043 
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ODA may be divided into three categories; the positive view that supports the positive 
impact of ODA on recipient countries; the negative view that sees the impact on 
recipient as negative and the neutral view that found neither positive nor negative 
impact of ODA on recipient countries.    
2.1 The positive view  
There are studies that were carried out and produced results that favour continued and 
even increased aid to developing countries. Brun et al (2010) reported that, for both 
donors and recipients “technical assistance associated programs” is important as it 
reinforces capability of institutions that plan and implement the reforms and 
encouraged assistance to tax administrations which should be made stronger in 
countries with “low quality bureaucracies”. An OECD report (2010) concluded that, 
“The preceding discussion suggests that the impact of aid on taxation is relatively 
ambiguous, and that blanket claims about the negative impact of aid on domestic 
taxation are unjustified. However, the equally important message for development 
partners is that aid may shape the relationship between taxation and improved 
governance in much broader ways”.  
Ouattara (2006) reported that, foreign aid has a positive influence on public 
investment; it is associated with higher expenditure on development, reduces non-
developmental expenditures and does not affect tax collection in recipient countries. 
Hansen and Tarp (2001) studied the interaction between foreign aid and growth on per 
capita real GDP and reported that aid increases the rate of growth that is not 
conditional on good policies. They reported decreasing returns to aid; estimating aid 
effectiveness is sensitive to the estimator chosen and the set of control variables 
applied. They concluded that, “We find a consistent pattern of results. Aid increases 
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aggregate savings; aid increases investment; and there is a positive relationship 
between aid and growth in reduced form models. The positive aid-growth link is a 
robust result from all three generations of work”.  
Tavares (2002) concluded that, “In this paper we ask whether foreign aid corrupts by 
using data on a cross-section of developing countries and instrumenting for total aid 
inflows. We find that foreign aid decreases corruption. Our results are statistically and 
economically significant and robust to the use of different controls.” Bulíř and Lane 
(2002) asserted that “As a starting point, from a fiscal perspective, aid can be used to 
increase expenditure, lower taxes, reduce debt, or a combination of all three”. Burnside 
and Dollar (2000) after their study emphasized policy rather than political institutions 
as a factor for the effectiveness of aid. They showed that foreign aid had good results in 
favourable environments such as fiscal, trade and monetary policies. The conclusion by 
Burnside and Dollar seem to imply that conditions tied to aid and better policies could 
improve its effectiveness. Burnside and Dollar (June, 1997) reported that, “Our primary 
question concerned the effect of aid on growth. Consistent with other authors, we 
found that on average aid has had little impact on growth. However, a robust finding 
was that aid has a positive impact on growth in a good policy environment.” Pack and 
Pack (1990) analyzed data for Indonesia and found that aid had not been diverted from 
development purposes, but in accordance with the way donors intended, and that aid 
had not reduced domestic revenue collection efforts. 
2.2 The negative view  
There are other studies that produced results that show negative impact of ODA on 
recipient countries:  
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African Economic Outlook, 2010 (a collaboration among AfDB, OECD, UNDP and 
UNECA) reports that, in developing countries, “Obviously, tax administrations are 
genuine in their desire to raise revenue, but the availability of large foreign aid flows 
may reduce the urgency with which revenue collection is pursued”. In addition, the 
report cautioned that there is a risk that aid-recipient governments that depend on ODA 
“may shy away from politically demanding income, property and local tax reforms, 
while these are precisely the areas that are likely to be most important to tax-
governance linkages”. Moyo (The Independent, 2009), argues that, “I have long 
believed that far from being a catalyst, foreign aid has been the biggest single inhibitor 
of Africa's growth. Among its shortcomings, aid is correlated with corruption, fosters 
dependency, and invariably instils bureaucracy that hinders the emergence of an 
essential entrepreneurial class. For Africa to grow in a sustained way, foreign aid will 
have to be dramatically reduced.”  
Kim and Kim (2011) while acknowledging the important role ODA played in the 
aftermath of the end of Japanese colonization, division of the country and the fratricidal 
Korean war, showed that the percieved and real reduction underway in foreign aid to 
the Republic of Korea was a major factor behind the reforms and anti-corruption 
measures in the tax administration body that led to increased domestic revenues. They 
showed that the increase in domestic fiscal revenue thanks to the reforms and anti-
corruption measures by the government of President Park Chung-Hee allowed the 
country to wean itself off foreign aid and therefore “taking ownership of its 
development process”. They reported that “Korea’s capacity to mobilize tax revenue, 
often taken for granted, was crucial in providing sufficient fiscal resources - 
government savings - to maintain an economic environment conducive to growth, not 
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to mention allow the government to take an active role in economic development. 
Fiscal soundness allowed Korea not only to manage inflation and induce foreign capital 
but also to make huge investments in education and infrastructure.”(pp2) 
Moss et al (2006) concluded that, “We have reviewed different bodies of literature that 
suggest that the current aid system may have undercut incentives for revenue collection 
and negatively affected public governance in Africa. In addition, we have examined a 
political science literature that finds both anti-development governance patterns across 
most of sub-Saharan Africa …Combined, they suggest that aid may undermine the 
development of effective state structures” and that “Aid may also reduce tax receipts 
directly, contributing to a cycle of low revenues and rising fiscal deficits… aid-
dependent countries may be inclined to underuse their available sources of tax 
revenues.”  
Ekanayake and Dasha (undated) from their study reported that “the major point 
emerging from this work is that foreign aid has a mixed impact on economic growth of 
developing countries… However, this variable is negative for low-middle income 
countries indicating that foreign aid has a negative effect on economic growth in these 
countries”. Acharya, et al (2004) after their study reported ‘transaction costs’ accruing 
to recipient governments which they classified as indirect and direct. One of the costs 
is the variety of donors, requiring ‘energies and attentions of senior government 
officials. 
The findings by Acharya et al (2004) were corroborated by Knack and Rahman (2004) 
who found that foreign aid undermined the efficiency of bureaucracy in poor countries 
as long as donors are fragmented. Reinikka and Svensson (2004) after their study in 
Uganda found that for the period 1991–95, schools received only an average of 13% of 
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the grants and that surveys in similar African countries were not different. McGillivray 
and Morrissey (2001) reported that “Fiscal response models identify how aid may 
induce government behaviour that undermines or enhances the positive impact of aid. 
Aid may be diverted to non-productive uses, it may discourage tax effort or encourage 
increased borrowing.”  
Morss (1984) reported that, “This donor and project build-up, which continues into the 
1980s, is having a negative impact on the major government institutions of developing 
nations. Instead of working to establish comprehensive and consistent development 
objectives and policies, government officials are forced to focus on pleasing donors by 
approving projects that mirror the current development enthusiasm of each donor. The 
results may be interpreted as the consequence of the transacting derived from donor 
fragmentation.”  
Djankov et al (2005) reported that, “we find that foreign aid has a negative impact …. 
In particular, if the foreign aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of five 
years reaches the 75
th
 percentile in the sample, then a 10-point index of democracy is 
reduced between 0.6 and one point, a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the 
effect of oil rents on political institutions. The fall in democracy if oil revenues reach 
the 75th percentile is smaller, (0.02). Aid is a bigger curse than oil”. 
Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2003) found out that the effectiveness of foreign aid is 
dependent on whether the aid is received through project financing or budget support. 
Boone (1996) showed that non-fungible aid may be more effective as opposed to 
fungible aid. Tirmizi (The Express Tribune), argues that “As a result of this semi-
constant flow of aid (to Pakistan), the government never faced enough fiscal pressure 
to fully tax the economy, inculcating a culture of tax evasion that plagues the country 
today. The government collects only a little more than nine per cent of the Gross 
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Domestic Product (GDP) in taxes and faces an annual fiscal deficit of about six per 
cent of GDP.”   
Others see aid as a deterrent to development; Reuters News Agency (2009) in an 
interview reported that for Africa, “…the global financial crisis is a chance to break a 
dependence on development aid that has kept it in poverty, argues Zambian economist 
Dambisa Moyo… believes more than $1 trillion in development aid over the past 50 
years has only entrenched Africa’s poverty, distorted economies and fuelled 
bureaucracy and corruption”.  
Mosley et al (1987) observed that, “…the apparent inability of development aid over 
more than twenty years to provide a net increment to overall growth in the Third World 
must give the donor community, as it gives us, cause for grave concern” 
2.3 The Neutral view 
There are other studies whose results are neither positive nor negative on the issue; 
Carter (2010) observed that, “Donors want to discover the extent to which aid tends to 
fund tax cuts rather than expenditure, but this paper has argued they are unlikely to 
learn much of use from statistical associations among aggregate data, gathered over the 
last few decades, particularly those based on the relationship between ratios like 
aid/GDP and tax/GDP” while Djankov et al (2006) concluded thus, “Making aid 
effective is difficult. The conditionality principle does not seem to work because of the 
lack of credibility of the punishment. Empirical studies show that loans may help to 
induce some discipline and a more effective use of the funds, since they have to be 
returned. … Finally, the increasing access to the aid market of new participants and the 
potential conflict of the goals of donors contribute to the ineffectiveness of aid. 
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Therefore, increasing the responsibility of recipient countries (by providing loans 
instead of grants in a credible policy environment), reducing the cost of remittances to 
developing countries, and improving the coordination of donors seem to be reasonable 
goals to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid”. 
Sachs et al. (2004) after their study recommended public investment instead of 
consumption ODA that is disbursed as grants because money received in form loans 
and has to be repaid and will be more efficiently utilised than grants. Barro and Lee 
(2002) analyzed IMF aid and its effectiveness and reported that foreign “loan 
participation rates reduce economic growth and investment, although they increase 
openness”. Brautigam (1992) after her study advised that donors should empower 
societies to “push” governments for accountability, openness and predictability that 
foster development.  
From the discussion above, there is no agreed position on the impact of foreign aid 
/ODA on recipient countries. The fact that aid may be detrimental to the recipients’ 
efforts to generate their own fiscal revenue resources leading to their governments to 
continuously expect others to fund their budgets should certainly worry both donors 
and recipients. The consequences of failure by ODA recipient countries to generate 
their own revenue is unfortunately evident, in the weak institutions, instability, poor 
governance, poverty and underdevelopment of countries and people in the developing 
world and if aid is the cause of such a state, its continued flow should be revised as 
indeed some have proposed. Specific research to study the impact of ODA on the 
domestic fiscal revenue mobilization efforts is needed because the whole issue of ODA 
and aid stems from some countries’ failure to generate enough domestic fiscal revenue 
resources.  
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Chapter 3: Background to the study 
3.1 History of Rwanda’s Political economy and fiscal legacy 
Prior to 1994, Rwanda’s was a small economy which for more than 30 years was 
controlled by a dictatorship that thrived on ethnic division to stay in power. During the 
1960s and 1970s, Rwanda received foreign development aid because it was, as 
Andersen (2000) reported, “known and admired by international donors as a successful 
non-communist Entwicklungsdiktatur (development dictatorship).”  
Rwanda government’s vision for the country was elaborated on May 1, 1974 by the 
then President who emphasized peasantry and glorified subsistence agriculture. 
Verwimp quoted President Habyarimana thus, “Some societies have, in the past, 
opposed (juxtaposed
2
) manual and intellectual labour with the latter giving in general 
more prestige to its performer. Such a concept not only seems outdated but also 
unacceptable because it is not realistic. In fact, manual labour, especially agricultural 
labour is the basis of our economy. We want to repeat that agriculture will stay the 
essential base of our economic system for the years to come…Remember that this is 
the way we want to fight this form of intellectual bourgeoisie and give all kinds of 
physical labour its value back.” Kalamogo et al (2008,) reported that, “From 1961 to 
1990, Rwanda had an administered economy characterized by the imposition of severe 
restrictions on trade and foreign exchange transactions, as well as a fixed exchange 
rate.” 
Coffee as the major export funded much of the state budget, for example, in 1986 
coffee exports comprised 82% of Rwanda’s exports. The government made popular the 
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 Added by the Author  
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expression “real work is to till the land, the rest is good luck” emphasizing the 
importance of rural peasantry agriculture. Rwanda’s population density was one of the 
highest in Africa in 1980s but the president of the country was defending those who 
had large families; for example, in July, 1980, President Habyarimana was quoted as 
saying he had learned a lot from his parents and his time on the farm and he himself 
had eight children. 
 In 1992, Rwanda's population was 7.5 million, and had recorded an annual growth 
rate of 3.3 % from 1985 to 1990 (UN Data 1993). When the government partially 
liberalised land purchase policy in late 1970s the rich and elite bought land from 
desperate small-holder farmers and by the mid-1980s, 26% of Rwandans were landless. 
Desforges (1999) reports that, “According to a government study done in 1991, the 
richest 16% of landowners held 43% of the land, while the poorest households tried to 
eke out a living on holdings that ranged from one quarter to three-quarters of a hectare, 
or less than an acre of land.”  
Moise (undated) reported that “85% of the Rwandan population [were] living well 
below the poverty line in the late 1980s and early 1990s”. The ruling elite enforced 
movement restrictions and rules set up during the colonial period to prevent landless 
citizens from migrating to urban centres. Rwandans intending to move from one 
location to another sought permission from the local administrators stating the motive, 
duration and people to see in another locality. In other words rural-urban-migration in 
Rwanda was prevented by laws that required peasants to seek permission for their 
travel from one district to another.  
UN Environmental Program (1993-94) reported that “Only 6 percent of Rwanda's 
population lived in urban areas in 1990, and the annual urban growth rate decreased 
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from 5.6 percent in the period 1955-60 to 4.9 percent in the years 1985-90.” Verwimp 
(undated) reports about the government policy to keep the people of Rwanda rural 
peasants thus; “Habyarimana followed a consistent policy to make the peasants stay in 
the rural areas. They had to remain in an agricultural setting. Of course, this anti-urban 
policy benefited people already living in the cities, the so-called ‘elite’. It also explains 
why in 1973, 95% of the population lived in the rural areas and in 1993, 95% still lived 
in the rural areas. The dictator considered cities places of immorality, theft and 
prostitution.” 
 
 
Figure 1: Rwanda’s GDP growth from 1960-2009 (source: World Bank website) 
 
In a bid to control and use the country’s economic resources, Kalamogo et al (March 
2008) reported that “every exporter and every importer was subjected to a quota, and 
all import operations were subject to a license authorizing external currency 
disbursement … Exporters were to repatriate currency generated by the sale of exports, 
and export licenses were authorized only by the Banque Nationale du Rwanda (BNR). 
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More importantly, all export earnings were transferred to and managed by the BNR 
which had to give prior approval for certain invisible transactions including medical 
care, tourist trips and study abroad”.  
 By the late 1980s coffee contributing “75 percent of Rwanda’s foreign exchange” 
earnings (Desforges 1999) had reduced both in volume and prices. In 1989 under threat 
of collapse of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), international coffee sell-offs 
began leading to collapse of international coffee prices by $.80/pound. The yearly GDP 
growth rate from 1973 to 1980 recorded at 6.5% reduced from 1980 to 1985 on average 
to 2.9%, and remained stagnant from 1986 to 1990. The country’s real per capita GDP 
averaged 0.10 % per annum for the period from 1980-1989. For the period 1986-1987, 
the country’s coffee export receipts reduced from 14 billion to 05 billion RwF. In 1990, 
when the first measures of an IMF structural adjustment program were carried out there 
was a crisis in the country as the government agreed to structural adjustment 
recommendations by the IMF program in 1990 under economic pressure, leading to 
currency devaluation of up to 40%.  
The economic hardships caused by the currency devaluation led to internal dissent 
among the population many of whom could not find enough food, increased demands 
for political pluralism and more freedoms. In 1990, refugees who had been denied the 
right to return from 1959 militarily attacked the country leading to a four year civil war, 
adding pressure to the economy. The combination of all these factors; defeat in the war, 
an economy in reverse, with annual GDP growth of -10% and -49% in 1993 and 1994 
respectively and with international pressure mounting for an inclusive government, 
came to bear on the regime that it planned and implemented the genocide against the 
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Tutsi minority in 1994 before looting the country and fleeing to Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (then known as Zaire). 
The genocide in which over 1.000.000 people were killed left the economy shattered 
and the country more impoverished. Moreover, because many of the people who 
organized the genocide before fleeing were government officials at different levels, the 
country was left with no manpower and Human resources to run the government 
bureaucracy. Rwanda was not only destroyed with no resources but there were no 
skilled personnel to run the country. The country needed aid particularly ODA to run 
the government and offer basic services. GDP per capita had plummeted to more than 
US$200, while poverty levels had become worse.  
In a nutshell by 1994, Rwanda was an overpopulated and impoverished small country 
after years of dictatorships that kept its citizens rural peasants, controlled the small 
economy majorly based on exports of tea and coffee in the hands of a few individuals, 
whose population was divided by years of ethnic divisions by government campaigns 
and an eighth of whose population had been killed while half was in refugee camps in 
the neighbouring countries.  What impact did ODA that went into the country after 
1994 have on Rwanda’s efforts to generate domestic fiscal revenue?  
 
3.2 Importance of ODA on Rwanda’s GDP and domestic Fiscal Revenue after 
1994 
Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) is the ability by governments to generate 
revenue within their territories, which become the resources for allocation to public 
goods and services. In this study, I am concerned with the government’s ability to 
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collect domestic resources for fiscal purposes in relation to ODA from bilateral, 
multilateral and multilateral institutional sources. The government carries out DRM 
through tax and nontax sources, domestic borrowing such as issuance of bonds and 
other forms of public revenue generation. 
 
Figure 2: Rwanda - Total Net ODA Disbursements (in US$M) Source: OECD/DAC 
Database 
 
DRM is important to Rwanda and other developing countries because; it forms the 
source of sustainable financing for development and is the cornerstone of governance 
especially through provision of public goods and services. DRM helps in strengthening 
fiscal institutions for stable collection of revenue that facilitate long term planning 
which to ensure that resources are allocated to priority sectors and that outcomes are in 
line with plans and goals. DRM that is accompanied by sustained economic growth 
may work as an antidote to the effects of aid dependency and allows countries to have 
an increased sense of ownership and the policy independency to implement 
programmes that reflect their development priorities. DRM also ensures accountability 
on part governments in provision of goods and services to those governed. 
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Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Tot. domestic rev. as %ge 
of GDP 
6.9 9.2 10.3 10.5 10 10.1 11.8 12.4 13 
Grants as percentage of 
GDP 
11.4 7.4 6.7 5.3 6.1 9.4 8.7 7.2 7.8 
Total domestic revenue 
(Billions RwF) 
23.1 39.4 58.1 66 63.6 68.7 86.2 101.2 122.3 
Table 1: Rwanda’s domestic fiscal revenue, grants as percentages of GDP and domestic 
total revenue collected for the period 1995-2003 (Source: BNR Annual Report, 2003). 
 
One of the biggest challenges that faced the government of Rwanda in 1994 in its 
reconstruction efforts was that there was no economy to tax. The inability to mobilize 
domestic fiscal revenues was not only because the economy had been destroyed but 
there were no skilled people to manage the tax department because former employees 
had been murdered or in exile. The economy which had been severely destroyed 
however regained and was growing by 80% for the period 1994 and 1998.  
 
Figure 3: Rwanda’s Foreign Aid (including Grants and Loans), foreign loans and net ODA 
(Source: Ezemeneri et al, 2008) 
Rwanda was able to increase its domestic fiscal revenue at a time its ODA was at its 
highest compared to the GDP because in part it was able to receive support to build its 
institutions and capacity. The ODA in form of technical and monetary support was 
used to train employees and build systems that allowed the country to increasingly 
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surpass its revenue targets. One of the first steps the government undertook was to set 
up the Rwanda Revenue Authority which was later supported by the British 
Department For International Development (DFID).  
 
Figure 4: Comparison between Nominal GDP growth and Revenue growth 1998-2004 
(RRA Report 2004 pp12) 
 
Ezemenari et al (2008) after their study reported that, “The result was that government 
revenue, estimated at about 13 percent of GDP in 1992, and which had fallen to below 
4 percent in 1994, began to increase gradually to reach an average of around 10 percent 
per annum between 1996 and 2001. By 2002, revenues stood at 12.2 percent of GDP, 
reflecting the increase in the VAT rate from 15 to 18 percent, and the substantial 
strengthening of revenue administration. Revenue as a share of GDP rose further in the 
following years and is now just under 15 percent.” 
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Figure 5: Rwanda’s real growth compared to East African Community and Sub-Sharan 
Africa (SSA) % (Source: World Bank, April 2011) 
 
Owens (Tax Justice Focus) summarized the ODA support to Rwanda Revenue 
Authority thus, “The Governance Dimension in Rwanda DFID’s support to the 
Rwandan Revenue Authority (RRA) has resulted in a significant increase in domestic 
revenue (from 9% of GDP in 1998 to 14.7% in 2005). Costs of collection have also 
been reduced. This success is the result of strengthening internal organisational 
structures and processes and of building accountable relationships with external 
partners, such as central and local government, a growing tax profession and taxpayers 
themselves. The RRA now plays an important role in strengthening relationships 
between citizens and the state, helping to build a [social contract] based on trust and 
co-operation”. 
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Table 2: Composition of Rwanda’s GDP and tax revenue growth in billions RwF (RRA 
2006) 
 
As Gurría (2009 pp15) points out, “On a more positive note, the Rwandan Revenue 
Authority, with strong international support, carried out changes to strengthen internal 
organisational structures and training, as well as improve relationships with local 
government. The result was a sharp increase in domestic revenue from 9% of GDP in 
1998 to nearly 15% in 2005.” Indeed the increase was both in both volume and 
percentage of GDP as shown above. 
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Table 3: Rwanda’s economic growth compared to some African countries in 
percentages (BNR 2003) 
 
Rwanda tax policy from a macroeconomic point aimed at raising domestic fiscal 
revenues, measured by tax/GDP ratios. RRA had as one of its objective to raise the 
2009/2010 tax/GDP ratio from 14 % to 15% of GDP, an increase from 9.2 % of GDP 
in 1996. Indeed since 1995, RRA has surpassed its targeted revenue collection as 
shown in the table below.  
As Addison et al (2006) report, “There is also a balance to be struck in mobilizing 
more revenue and doing so in ways that do not discourage innovation, and growth 
through punitive tax rates. Therefore while countries take action to broaden the existing 
narrow tax base, aid inflows must continue at high levels and, indeed, donors need to 
step up aid if governments are to meet the ambitious Millennium Development Goals.”  
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Table 4: Tax gap and tax effort for selected EAC countries and South Africa for selected 
years, 
 (Ezemenari et al 2008 pp44) 
 
The support to Rwanda’s tax body, partly from ODA, has enabled it to compare 
favourably with other countries in the region, their history and resources 
notwithstanding. At a time when ODA accounted for half of Rwanda’s fiscal revenue, 
it is inconceivable, that the country would have had the resources and other means to 
achieve continued success.  
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Figure 6: Comparison of RRA performance against targets figures in billions RwF 
(RRA2008, Pp9). See table below. 
 
Table 5: Rwanda Actual revenue performance compared to targets 1998-2005 in 
billions (RRA 2008) 
 
From the discussion above, in accordance with the stated Hypothesis, ODA has a 
positive impact on domestic revenue mobilization. From the evidence, the ODA as a 
percentage of GDP and the achievements, there is a very strong positive relationship 
between ODA and the domestic fiscal revenue generation by Rwanda as a recipient.  
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Figure 7: Comparison of Rwanda and other African countries’ Tax revenues as 
percentage of GDP 2010 (Pezzini 2011). 
 
It is important to note that out of the total ODA extended to many aid recipient 
countries the fraction of it going to tax administration is smaller. It is reported that, “of 
the US$7.1 billion spent in 2005 on bilateral aid for government administration, 
economic policy and public sector financial management, only 1.7% was directed at 
tax-related assistance” (Pretoria Communiqué, 2008).  
No one should over look the importance of leadership in Rwanda’s utilization of ODA 
and attempts to improve the economy of the country. President Kagame’s anti-
corruption stand is exemplified by the fact that prior to the elections in 2010 two 
cabinet ministers from his own party, three Directors Generals and other high ranking 
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government officials were in prison on corruption related charges. The fact that there 
are low levels of corruption is a result of empowering institutions like the Ombudsman, 
Auditor General, the Police, Prosecution office and the Judiciary which investigate and 
prosecute corruption related cases which were empowered to carry out their duties 
which may not be the case in other countries where politics and public administration 
are intertwined.  
Rwanda government has made improvements in many sectors governance with 
decentralization and built institution to fight corruption which has increased its 
nationals’ confidence in the authority for example; in a study by Transparency 
International in 2011, it was reported that, “the likelihood of encountering bribe 
demand occurrences is 3.9%, the prevalence of bribery is 2.15% and the impact of 
bribery on service delivery is 1.98%, while more than 80% of Rwandans have neither 
encountered nor witnessed corruption”. Indeed Rwanda was ranked at world No. 66 in 
world rankings ahead of Italy and Brazil according to Transparency International 
(2010) corruption indices. The globally recognized Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and East African Bribery Index (EABI) have in the 
recent past revealed that Rwanda is the best performing country in the East African 
region and is ranked 9
th
 in the African continent when it comes to corruption control. 
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Figure 8: Rwanda - Total Net ODA as a Percentage of GNI (OECD/DAC Database) 
 
Tax policies in Rwanda did not only increase domestic revenue in terms of volumes and 
as a percentage of GDP, the efficiency and effectiveness of Rwanda Revenue authority 
increased thanks in part to ODA through technical and advisory support. Rwanda may 
have attained the tax mobilization the country did; but no one can doubt that the time 
would have been longer and the achievements less without ODA particularly in the 
crucial area of personnel training and capacity building. RRA continually surpassed its 
revenue target as shown in graph above and table below. The support of ODA in the 
performance of GDP and revenue mobilization cannot be overemphasized. 
 
Table 6: Rwanda Tax administration costs and cost as percentage of total taxes 
(Emezenari et al, 2008) 
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The importance of ODA on the capacity building of RRA as the national tax body in 
Rwanda is best captured in the study carried out by Land (2004) who reported that, 
“ Without DFID support, it would not have been possible to finance a substantial part 
of the organisational development process that the RRA has undertaken. Whilst the 
organisation's running costs have been met from the state budget, it did not have 
adequate means to invest in its own organisational development, whether in terms of 
covering the costs of training, bursaries, hiring experts or purchasing equipment. By 
providing all of these inputs in a timely and flexible manner, DFID has considerably 
accelerated the pace of change within the RRA”. 
 
Table 7: Increase of registered tax payers in Rwanda for selected years (RRA Report) 
 
The support extended to RRA has allowed it not only to collect more revenue but 
improve its efficiency and relationship with tax payers thereby improving its long term 
relationship with nationals and build its capacity to serve its core mission (see table 
below). Since its inception, RRA has surpassed it annual targets every year and its 
efficiency has improved over the period of its existence. 
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Figure 9: Collection costs as a percentage of collected tax revenues for some countries 
(Stijns, 2011) 
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From the above, there is a strong case that ODA helps recipient countries to strengthen 
their capacity to collect and increase their domestic revenues as was the case in 
Rwanda. There is no doubt that RRA might have attained some of the results it did, but 
the duration, achievements and pace may have been different without ODA which 
supported the institution and the country in general.  
 
Figure 10: Comparison of some African economies’ actual against potential tax 
revenue (Stijns) 
 
Tax effort “is an index measure of how well a country is doing in terms of tax 
collection, relative to what could be reasonably expected given its economic potential. 
It is a ratio that, by construction, is always positive. Tax effort is calculated by dividing 
its actual tax share by an estimate of how much tax the country should be able to 
collect given the structural characteristics of its economy”3.This calls for a delicate 
balance between increased tax volumes and optimal rates that do not distort the 
opportunities to economic agents for example higher tax rates may drive some agents 
                                                 
3
 Source: African Outlook available at http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/in-depth/public-
resource-mobilisation-and-aid-2010/the-state-of-public-resource-mobilisation-in-africa/tax-effort/ 
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out of business. Countries that are naturally endowed with natural resources such as oil 
may apply less than optimal effort compared to those without resources as shown in the 
graph above.      
 
Figure 11: Rwanda fiscal operations 1995-2003 in RWF billions (source: BNR 2003) 
 
The country in an effort to overcome “its small market status” joined together with 
Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Burundi in the East African Community (EAC) creating 
a common market of 150 million people with a stated object of forming a political 
federation. The country has also won international recognition in several areas for 
example its efforts to finding better living conditions for its citizens was awarded with 
“what is currently the most prestigious human settlements accolade in the world - the 
Habitat Scroll of Honour Award” (RDB, March 2011). Rwanda has also protected its 
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environment and was the first country in the region to put in place stringent 
environmental policies as Leahy (September, 2011) reported, “Government policies are 
seldom lauded, yet Rwanda's forest policy has resulted in a 37-percent increase in 
forest cover on a continent better known for deforestation and desertification… 
Rwanda's National Forest Policy has also resulted in reduced erosion, improved local 
water supplies and livelihoods… Rwanda was the winner of the prestigious Future 
Policy Award for 2011”  
Year Time release 
2007 3 days, 11 hours and 16 minutes 
2008 2 days, 19 hours and 32 minutes 
2009 1 day, 5 hours and 49 minutes 
2010 1 day, 2 hours  and 3 minutes 
Table 8: Release time of goods from Customs (RRA report 2009-2010) 
 
Rwanda embarked on a drive to make tourism as a major economic factor and source 
of income for the country. For several years after the 1994 genocide tourism in Rwanda 
remained a distant possibility with little interest from tourists and security concerns 
over instability caused by former government soldiers and killers who raided the 
country from neighbouring Zaire later renamed Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
Rwanda was declared “the only country to take away the Best African Exhibitor award 
for the fourth time in a row at the world’s premier tourism trade fair, Internationale 
Tourismus Börse (ITB-Berlin) 2010” (The Rwanda Focus, 2010). From merely 417 
tourists in 1999, Rwanda hosted 666,000 tourists in 2010, a 10% over the previous year, 
generating 200 million USD compared to 175 Million generated the previous year. 
Rwanda was ranked one of the top 5 emerging destinations by the 2011 Wanderlust 
Travel Awards committee. As a sign of improving tourism, the industry earned Rwf 33 
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billion (US$56 million) in revenues in the 1
st
 quarter of 2011, compared to the same 
period the previous year when US$43 million was realized. 201,088 visitors visited the 
country during the same period representing an increase of 32 % (Daily Monitor online, 
2011). 
 
 
Figure 12: Rwanda Tourism revenue (US$ million), 1992-2008 (Nielsen and Spenceley 
April 2010) 
 
According to the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business 2010’, “the small East African 
country reformed in 7 areas propelling its rankings an unprecedented 76 places from 
143 in the Doing Business 2009 survey to 67 out of the 183 countries surveyed.” 
Rwanda emerged among the top performing countries on the competitiveness index for 
the year 2011-2012 for the second year in a row according to the World Economic 
Forum (WEF) in which the country emerged third in Africa behind Mauritius and 
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South Africa jumping ten positions from number 80 in the 2010-2011 to 70 in the 
2011-2012 overall world rankings.  
As a result, the country’s dependence on, “Aid as a percentage of government spending 
dropped from 85% in 2000 to 45% in 2010” according to ACTIONAID citing reforms 
such as the country’s tax administration that improved and was able to quadruple the 
country’s own taxes between 1998 and 2006 (ACTIONAID, 2011). RDB reported that 
in the year 2010, “105 Investment projects were registered and will generate 381M 
US$ in 2010 of which FDI is estimated at 173M US$, while local investments are 
estimated at 208M US$. These will create 12,736 jobs”.  
In its Doing Business Report 2011, the World Bank commended Rwanda for easing the 
doing business environment, “The 10 economies that made the largest strides in 
making their regulatory environment more favorable to business are Georgia, Rwanda, 
Belarus, Burkina … In 2005 starting a business in Rwanda took 9 procedures and cost 
223% of income per capita. Today entrepreneurs can register a new business in 3 days, 
paying official fees that amount to 8.9% of income per capita. More than 3,000 
entrepreneurs took advantage of the efficient process in 2008, up from an average of 
700 annually in previous years. Registering property in 2005 took more than a year 
(371 days), and the transfer fees amounted to 9.8% of the property value. Today the 
process takes 2 days and costs 0.4% of the value”. In an interview ‘Narrow Minds’, 
reported that, “Rwanda is now one of Africa’s major success stories and is growing in 
leaps and bounds. The government has shown it is serious and determined about 
rebuilding its economy …Who does not want to be associated with success”? 
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Figure 13: Annual TFP growth rate (%) in Rwanda, 1960-2003 (Kalamogo et al, 2008) 
 
Rwanda’s case may be different because of its history and leadership; in fact the 
country has defied many predictions and studies. As an example, Knack (World Bank) 
reported that, “Analyses of cross-country data in this paper provide evidence that 
higher aid levels erode the quality of governance, as measured by indexes of 
bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law” and yet Rwanda with high levels 
of ODA as a percentage of fiscal budget, Rwanda is the first country where women 
outnumber men in parliament with 56% members of Parliament (BBC 2008). 
Moreover under the provisions of the constitution, a 30% quota in all government 
appointments and positions are reserved for women; 92% of the population of Rwanda 
have medical insurance (McNail 2010) while the budgetary allocation to health 
services particularly in the utilization of ICT and Telemedicine as a proportion of total 
budget is relatively higher given the country’s resources, for example, it was reported 
that Rwanda had invested $2 million in telemedicine. 
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Figure 14: Rwanda’s GDP growth from 1980-2011 
(http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/country/Rwanda)/ 
Cunningham (IPS 2007) reported that the country’s “current ICT sector budget is on 
par with nations of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), a grouping of 30 rich nations, at 1.6 percent, far above the African average… 
One billion dollars was committed in 2006… to building nationwide tele-centres with 
Internet and telephone access points, allowing for increased connectivity and mobility 
in rural areas.” 
Dr Anna Thomas, ActionAid’s Head of Economic & Social Development, put it better, 
"Not all aid is the same. Real aid is effective and has few strings attached. It puts 
developing countries where they should be - in the driving seat of their own 
development. It makes governments answerable to their own citizens, rather than to the 
donors. And real aid can help countries do things like raising tax revenues more 
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effectively, so they can generate more of their own funds for development” (Real aid 
Report).  
The Rwanda freedom indices shown below may be normal or even average by some 
countries’ standards; however to many social, political and economic observers of 
Rwanda, they represent a major transformation for a country that was devastated by 
civil war, genocide and years of dictatorships. As Amartya (1999) argues, “If freedom 
is what development advances, then there is a major argument for concentrating on that 
overarching objective, rather than on some particular means, or some chosen list of 
instruments.  Viewing development in terms of expanding substantive freedoms 
directs attention to the ends that make development important, rather than merely to 
some of the means that, inter alia, play a prominent part in the process.”  The change 
in Rwanda can be better represented by the improved freedoms enjoyed by its nationals 
as shown in the graph below. 
 
 
Figure 15: Comparison of Rwanda, Africa and World Human Development Index 
trends from 1980 to 2010 http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/RWA.html 
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The discussion above shows how Rwanda was able to transition from a country 
destroyed by years of autocracy and poor economic management using ODA. This will 
be proven in analytical terms using empirical evidence in the next chapters. 
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Chapter 4: Research Design 
 4.0 Overview 
This study uses a simple and easy to understand statistical calculation of the 
relationship and correlation between three variables: ODA, GDP and Domestic Fiscal 
Revenue (Domestic Taxes) while other factors are considered given. The data analyzed 
covers the period 1995- 2009 excluding 2005 for which data could not be found.  By 
observing the correlation and significance of the interplay among the three different 
sets of variables, we can reach a conclusion.  
Whereas the study uses Rwanda as a case study, the impact of ODA on Uganda’s GDP 
and tax revenues is considered for comparative purposes. Using Uganda for the study 
purpose is appropriate because; both countries received large amounts of ODA during 
the period under review; both countries are located in the same geographical location 
(though Uganda is comparatively larger in land size); both had low intensity 
insurgency for the period under review which may have had similar effects on their 
economies, both are land locked, both are agricultural economies and both have similar 
exports and imports, the volumes notwithstanding. The results may be applied to other 
countries in similar development stages receiving ODA. At the end of the exercise 
results will show the impact of ODA on their domestic fiscal revenue mobilization 
efforts in terms of volumes and GDP growth.        
4.1 Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model used by this study is that Rwanda and Uganda receive ODA 
whose two governments use to finance both development and recurrent expenditures. 
Because the governments receive this “free windfall” less effort is put in collecting 
local revenue from domestic sources.  Over a given period, local revenue collections 
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will deteriorate as policy makers wait for more “windfalls.” Specifically, as more ODA 
is received by Rwanda and Uganda, domestic revenue collected should increase at a 
slower pace and over time will stagnate or even decline. The same applies to the GDP 
of the countries; as more ODA is received, people have less incentive to work harder, 
production slumps and instead emphasis is put on rent seeking and sharing the windfall 
that ODA is. Simply put, the relationship among ODA, GDP and domestic revenue 
should be inverse. 
Scope of the study 
This study will examine the relationship among three variables: ODA, GDP and 
Domestic Tax revenue figures for the period 1995-2009 excluding the year 2005 for 
which figures could not be obtained of the Republics of Rwanda and Uganda. The 
discussion part, however, will focus on the impact of ODA on Rwanda’s Domestic Tax 
revenues and tax revenue collection.   
Sources and validity of Data 
This study uses secondary data from three different sources; ODA figures were found 
at OECD/DAC website (http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/) at USD current prices, GDP in 
USD Constant at 2005 rate for Rwanda and USD constant 2000 for Uganda 
respectively. Revenue figures in local currency calculated at 2005 rate for Rwanda are 
from annual RRA Reports and USD 2000 constant for Uganda were got from World 
Bank Website (http://databank.worldbank.org). Other sources of information and data 
are books, published reports, professional and academic research journals and news 
media. 
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Data used 
For the purpose of this study government revenue is the total sum of tax and nontax 
revenue to the government treasury (excluding loans and grants) generated within the 
country. Revenue in its different forms; corporate, excise, VAT, income, withholding 
and other types of taxes are combined with other sources such as profits from 
government businesses, royalties, and rent proceeds to the national treasury.  
4.2 Empirical Model 
The empirical model is based an economy where government fiscal revenue is made up 
of tax and Non-tax revenue to which ODA is introduced 
                 GR f (TR, NTR)                                 (1) 
Where 
 GR refers to the Initial government fiscal revenue 
 TR refers Tax revenue,  
 NTR refers Non Tax revenue  
GR f (TR, NTR, ODA)                             (2) 
 ODA is stock of externally generated ODA. 
I assume (1) above to be linear in logs and below are the determinants of the growth 
rate of government revenue,  
GR t nt oda                                         (3) 
Where t, nt and oda denote the determinants of the growth rate of each variable 
individually. 
The function of government revenue, therefore, should be as follows; 
GRit0 (TR/GDP)it2 (NTR/GDP)it3 
(ODA/GDP)
2
it…μ(4) 
GRit is the growth rate of government fiscal revenue in the country i (Rwanda) in year t 
For the hypotheses to be rejected, the model should be as follows implying that as more 
ODA is received into the country, both tax and nontax revenue decline. 
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GRit24  (ΔODA/GDP)
2
it6 (∇T/GDP)it ( ∇ NT/GDP)it μ             
(5
The purpose of this study is to test statistical significance of the marginal impact of 
ODA on government fiscal revenue and economic growth. For the hypothesis to be 
rejected the expected signs of the coefficients should over time be negative meaning 
that the more ODA received in the country the less tax revenue will be collected. The 
same model is applied to the country’s GDP against ODA where GDP is a function of 
Labour (L) and capital (K) in an economy to which externally generated ODA is added. 
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Empirical analysis of impact of ODA on domestic taxes in Rwanda 
Year  GDP( $ Const'05)  ODA in USD  
Tot. Rev. 
(05$Const) 
1995    1,293,447,630  694,700,000 41,717,836 
1996    1,382,334,846  465,310,000 71,155,096 
1997    1,851,557,081  229,600,000 104,926,678 
1998    1,989,343,579  350,070,000 119,193,816 
1999    1,931,185,216  373,080,000 114,859,496 
2000    1,734,921,293  321,460,000 124,069,927 
2001    1,674,685,046  304,850,000 155,674,348 
2002    1,640,603,017  362,890,000 182,763,852 
2003    1,846,148,216  335,180,000 220,869,754 
2004    2,088,892,750  489,600,000 245,792,097 
2006    3,111,203,756  588,950,000 370,042,621 
2007    3,741,050,578  722,210,000 456,187,243 
2008    4,712,306,077  933,150,000 688,615,185 
2009    5,261,963,315  934,380,000 714,801,705 
Table 9: Rwanda’s, total ODA, total GDP, and total revenue 1995-2009 
 
① ODA figures were obtained from OECD/DAC website 
(http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/) 
② GDP were from the World Bank Website 
(http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=2&id=4&hActiveDimensionId
=WDI_Series) 
③ Revenue figures for Rwanda were collected from different RRA reports and 
calculated at the 2005 USD constant exchange rate from Local Currency (RwF). 
http://www.rra.gov.rw/IMG/pdf/RRA_ANNUAL_REPORT_ 
④ Domestic Tax figures for Uganda were obtained from the World Bank website and 
calculated at 2000 USD Constant rate from Local Currency (UShs). 
⑤ Exchange rates were obtained from Center for International Comparisons, 
University of Pennsylvania http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php 
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4.3 Hypothesis testing 
(1) Hypothesis one: Ho1: “There is a significant positive relationship between ODA 
and domestic Revenue collected.  
Correlations 
  Revenue ODA 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Revenue 1.000 .822 
ODA .822 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Revenue . .000 
ODA .000 . 
N Revenue 14 14 
ODA 14 14 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant
) 
-1.368E8 8.628E7 
 
-1.586 .139 
ODA .778 .156 .822 4.999 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Revenue 
 
The Sig. (1-tailed) of .000 of the regression between ODA and domestic Revenue 
figures shows how significantly correlated the two variables are in case of Rwanda. 
With R Square at .676 and Std. Error of the Estimate of $1.301E8 the significance is 
robust at .000 as proven by the coefficients above; implying a strong and robust 
relationship between the two variables.  
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(2) Hypothesis 2:  
Ha2: “There is significant positive relationship between ODA and economic 
growth” 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjust
ed R 
Squar
e 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 .827
a 
.684 .658 $7.379E
8 
.684 26.034 1 12 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), ODA 
b. Dependent Variable: GDP 
 
Similar results are observed when ODA and GDP figures for Rwanda are put to the 
same test: the regressions show a high and significant correlation as confirmed by the 
significance of the coefficients at .000 which support the hypothesis that there is a 
highly significant positive relationship among the three variables under review.    
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Comparative analysis of impact of ODA on domestic taxes in Uganda 
 Country: Uganda 
      
Year 
Exch 
Rate 
Net ODA 
(cur.US$) 
GDP 
(constant 2000 
US$) 
Rev. US$ 2000 
Const 
Tax Rev. Const 
USD 2000 
1995 
     
969  
            
832,870,000  
           
4,620,924,068  
    
1996 
     
1,046  
            
673,670,000  
           
5,040,139,594  
    
1997 
     
1,083  
            
812,850,000  
           
5,297,186,807  
    
1998 
     
1,240  
            
655,150,000  
           
5,557,027,883  
         
489,639,451  
                    
461,484,575  
1999 
   
1,455  
            
604,980,000  
           
6,004,588,040  
             
578,092,270  
                    
568,909,811  
2000 
     
1,644  
            
853,000,000  
           
6,193,246,632  
             
614,334,813  
                    
594,721,542  
2001 
     
1,756  
            
822,190,000  
           
6,514,283,550  
             
658,698,642  
                    
653,641,835  
2002 
     
1,798  
            
725,280,000  
           
7,083,155,463  
             
762,196,299  
                    
737,003,902  
2003 
     
1,964  
            
997,480,000  
           
7,541,666,438  
             
867,111,824  
                    
852,113,183  
2004 
     
1,810  
          
1,215,640,000  
           
8,055,045,270  
           
1,015,069,018  
                    
998,528,788  
2006 
     
1,831  
          
1,553,680,000  
           
9,488,864,309  
           
1,406,533,081  
                  
1,356,669,152  
2007 
     
1,723  
          
1,737,020,000  
         
10,287,107,994  
           
1,655,460,443  
                  
1,596,753,533  
2008   
          
1,641,250,000  
         
11,182,997,488  
           
1,974,385,586  
                  
1,922,255,018  
2009   
    
1,785,880,000  
         
11,993,479,808  
           
2,302,625,579  
                  
2,227,043,637  
Table 10: Uganda’s exchange rates, ODA, GDP and Tax Revenue 1995-2003 
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Regression of ODA against GDP in Uganda 1995-2009 excluding 2005 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardiz
ed 
Coefficient
s 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Consta
nt) 
-2.146E8 1.401E8 
 
-1.531 .152 
GDP .171 .018 .940 9.551 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: ODA 
 
Correlations 
  GDP ODA 
GDP Pearson Correlation 1 .940** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
Sum of Squares and Cross-products 7.384E19 1.262E19 
Covariance 5.680E18 9.705E17 
N 14 14 
ODA Pearson Correlation .940** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
Sum of Squares and Cross-products 1.262E19 2.439E18 
Covariance 9.705E17 1.876E17 
N 14 14 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Regression of data for Uganda show a statistically significant relationship of Sig. (2-
tailed) of .000 with a Pearson Correlation.940 between GDP against ODA and 
domestic revenue figures against ODA with Sig. (2-tailed) of .000 at Pearson 
Correlation. 
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Correlation between ODA and Taxes-Uganda 
 
Correlations 
  
TAX ODA 
TAX Pearson Correlation 1 .900** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
Sum of Squares and 
Cross-products 
6.396E18 3.555E18 
Covariance 4.920E17 2.735E17 
N 14 14 
OD
A 
Pearson Correlation .900** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
Sum of Squares and 
Cross-products 
3.555E18 2.439E18 
Covariance 2.735E17 1.876E17 
N 14 14 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
(2-tailed). 
Regression of ODA against Taxes 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standar
dized 
Coeffici
ents 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Con
stant) 
5.898E
8 
8.462E
7 
 
6.97
0 
.000 
TAX .556 .078 .900 7.15
9 
.000 
a. Dependent Variable: ODA 
 
 
The time lag between ODA disbursements, economic growth and/or domestic revenue 
receipts is not considered in the case of Rwanda. As mentioned earlier, the country 
began from a low level because the government prior to 1994 had expended much of 
the national resources on the war effort, organized the murder of a million of its 
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citizens and looted the country of all valuables before stampeding a quarter of the 
population into exile in Zaire (DR Congo). The new government lacked the resources 
both material and human to manage the existing economy and collect taxes which 
amounted to a mere 41,717,836 USD for the year 1995. This meant that every resource 
was immediately put to use and there was no time spent between receipts and 
implementation. 
The disturbance in the regression may be explained by several factors: 
1. The defeated former government troops raided Rwanda from Zaire/DR Congo, which 
prompted the Rwandan government to attack the latter and overthrew the government 
there but the war dragged on for six years as former government troops with the 
support of Congo government attacked Rwanda. The war, therefore, diverted national 
resources and affected ODA receipts too.  
2. The country relied on exports of coffee and tea in the 1990s whose prices fluctuated 
effecting the economy, ODA receipts notwithstanding; for example in the year 2003 
the economy grew by 0.9 compared to 6.7 and 9.4 in 2001 and 20002 respectively and 
4.0 in 2004. In 2003 value of coffee and tea exports, with value added (1995 constant 
prices) earned the country 6.14 billion RWF compared to 8.23 billion for 2002, a 
significant reduction of 25.4%.  
 
4.4 Discussion of the results 
1. The testing of the hypothesis was meant to understand the relationship between 
ODA and total fiscal revenue generated and, ODA and GDP growth for the period 
under review in both Rwanda and Uganda. The regression of the correlation among 
Domestic fiscal Revenue, ODA and GDP is robust and positively in favour of both 
hypotheses for the two countries Rwanda and Uganda. In case of Rwanda’s domestic 
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revenue against ODA, the Pearson Correlation is 1.000 with Sig. (1-tailed) of .000 with 
R Square at .676 at a Std. Error of the estimate of $1.301E8 while for the coefficients 
with a Std. Error of 8.628E7 it was .156 with robust significance of .000. The same 
results are observed when the country’s GDP figures are regressed and correlated 
against ODA. Similar results are obtained when figures for Uganda’s GDP, ODA and 
domestic revenue are put to the same test for the period under review which also show 
a highly positive correlation which leads to the hypotheses to be accepted. In brief, 
there is a high and positive correlation among ODA, domestic fiscal revenue and ODA 
received by both Rwanda and Uganda for the period under review. 
2. In the post-war period in Rwanda of 1995, capital flows and financing for the 
fiscal budget was mainly in form of ODA because there were meagre foreign direct 
investments. This however led to increase in liquidity in the country which 
necessitated efforts to maintain macroeconomic stability leading to prudent financial 
and monetary management of the economy as a whole ensuring stability and controlled 
inflation in the wake of the sudden increase of ODA. This may be the reason the 
country did not face the phenomenon highlighted by Djankov et al (2005) where a 
sudden increase in aid money leads to instability and rent seeking. 
3. In the year 1995, only 6.9% of Rwanda’s GDP was taxed, two years later 10% of 
GDP was collected as fiscal revenue and by 2003, 13% of GDP was collected as 
domestic revenue. Much of the improvement can be attributed to government efforts to 
increase domestic revenue although during the same period under review, the country 
received ODA with a maximum of 11.4% and minimum of 5.3% of GDP. The effort 
was directed through the creation and support of RRA in 1997 which was empowered 
and strengthened for domestic revenue collection. Domestic fiscal revenue in Rwanda 
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which had been 13% of GDP in 1992 and 4 % in 1994 increased to 10% from 1996 to 
2001 and 12.2% of GDP by 2002. Revenue as a share of GDP rose to 14% by 2004. 
This contrasts with the findings of McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) and indeed 
proves wrong the argument that more ODA leads to lower domestic fiscal revenue. 
Rwanda consistently increased domestic revenue even as more ODA went into the 
country. 
4. In Rwanda, ODA as a percentage of GDP reduced from 95% as per the year 1994 
to merely 19.2 % in 2004. ODA also played an important role in macroeconomic 
stability particularly balance of payments where capital inflows were mainly grants 
and loans as the major source of budget finance. Government was able to extend 
medical, educational and agricultural extension services partly because of the ODA 
that was received in the country. This is in line with the findings of Bulíř and Lane 
(2002) and Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
5. In a bid to harmonise the external financing that came into the country from the 
different bilateral, multilateral and institutional sources, the government of Rwanda 
established the Central Public Investments and External Finance Bureau (CEPEX) as 
an agency within the Ministry of Finance and economic planning. Instead of donors 
and their representatives meeting and undertaking collaborations at different 
ministerial and departmental levels, all such dealings were assigned to CEPEX. This 
helped the country to avoid the problems such as the “transaction costs” highlighted by 
Acharya, et al (2004), the findings by Knack and Rahman (2004), Reinikka and 
Svensson (2004), Cordella and Dell’Ariccia (2003) and Morss (1984) .  
6. The government of Rwanda has promoted zero tolerance to corruption which may 
explain the level efficiency and efficacy of ODA and the continued support from 
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donors who are satisfied with the way funds are utilized. The investigation and 
prosecution of culprits in abuse of public funds particularly during the procurement 
process ensures proper utilisation of funds and in a timely and coordinated manner.  
7. Much of the efficiency and effectiveness of RRA can be attributed to ODA from 
the British government through DFID which went into training and modernisation of 
the Authority. This is in tandem with the views of Brun et al (2010), Ouattara (2006), 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Pack and Pack (1990). In particular, the support given 
to RRA and the achievements it was able to attain augurs well with the findings of 
Brun et al (2010) who advocated for technical assistance related programs ODA 
because they “reinforce administrations that define and implement the reform” and 
assistance for tax bodies which should be strengthened in “countries with low quality 
bureaucracies”.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendation for further studies 
This thesis aimed at studying the impact ODA on the fiscal revenue effort of recipient 
countries. Rwanda was chosen because it received large amounts of ODA (as a 
percentage of GDP and not in absolute amounts compared to other recipients), its 
economy was among the poorest and its institutions were destroyed before the period 
under review and had to be rebuilt anew after 1994. In a way Rwanda started from a 
very low level in her development effort particularly human resources and institutional 
capacity building.  
Results have shown that contrary to some studies and findings that ODA retards 
domestic fiscal revenue collection efforts, increases rent-seeking and weaker 
institutions, Rwanda used it to increase the volumes of fiscal revenue year after year 
and increased the efficiency of the country’s revenue agency, the Rwanda Revenue 
Authority. Drawing on inferences from the test carried out, ODA had a positive and 
healthy relationship for the increase and strengthening of GDP, fiscal revenue and 
institutional growth in Rwanda.   
Whereas the results of the hypothesis testing are true for Rwanda, whether they are 
applicable to another country is beyond the scope of this study and this is due several 
reasons. What is proven however is that ODA had a positive impact on the country’s 
GDP and domestic fiscal revenue mobilization efforts because: it reduced the 
constraint on budget, availed the scarce foreign exchange, supported areas which might 
have been considered non-priority in the allocation of the scarce resources and helped 
build local capacity in selected areas.  
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The role of ODA in Rwanda cannot be over emphasised because it enabled the 
government to allocate scarce resources to sectors that may not be otherwise allocated 
funds considering the pressing demand on the available domestically raised revenue. 
ODA also allowed the government to find an optimal tax rate for the economy which 
might have been higher and possibly “punitive” without it. If there were no ODA 
available, the tax rates would increase exorbitantly and in a globalized world, capital 
flight may take place from those countries where the tax rates may be higher and head 
for tax havens, which is detrimental to many developing countries.  
Recipient countries must have the willingness and ability to harness the received ODA 
and put it to national priorities in a transparent way and on programs it is intended. 
This may explain the success and significant relationship between ODA and GDP and 
ODA and domestic fiscal revenue mobilization efforts in Rwanda as discussed earlier. 
The importance of ODA to fiscal revenues and GDP of Rwanda was important, 
especially technical assistance to the revenue administration agency like RRA. ODA is 
important for revenue administration because it strengthens the capacity of revenue 
collection Institutions in recipient countries which may explain the positive relationship 
among ODA, GDP and domestic revenue mobilization efforts in case of Rwanda. 
There is no doubt that the positive relationship and coefficients among the three 
variables studied in this thesis were a result of deliberate policies and efforts of the 
Rwanda government and ODA received.  
Areas for further research 
Rwanda received grants for the most of its aid. However, it is not clear whether 
Rwanda would have achieved the same success in mobilizing domestic resources for 
development as it did with the loan form of aid. This may require further research.
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